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Abstract 
 
Armed conflict in the Balkans from 1990 – 1995 took roughly 200,000 lives and 
displaced around 2 million more. By 1993, the mounting human rights abuses occurring in the 
region prompted the United Nations Security Council to establish an ad hoc court purposed for 
the prosecution of war criminals. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) marked the first time that a war crimes tribunal was created during an ongoing conflict, 
thus raising the question: what role did the ICTY play in shaping the conduct and outcome of the 
war in the Balkans? Studying the impact of the tribunal necessitates a historical and political 
awareness of the (f)actors that influenced its construction and implementation. After thorough 
analysis of both the war and the tribunal, this thesis uses documentary evidence from actors who 
worked closely with the tribunal in order to tell the story of the ICTY and its influence on war in 
Bosnia. I ultimately argue that the tribunal was a humanitarian project undergirded by Western 
policy interests that enabled the Clinton administration to delay much-needed military 
intervention and later exclude Bosnian Serbs from the Dayton Accords. This had both positive 
and negative effects on the conflict’s progression towards peace, as well as on the development 
of international humanitarian law. Although focused specifically on the ICTY, the study more 
generally highlights the political nature of international law and how it allows Western powers to 
regulate legal justice.  
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Preface 
 
This thesis was submitted in the midst of the COVID-19 outbreak that has, in the spring 
of 2020 alone, altered our entire world. The virus has impacted my project in unfortunate ways: I 
am unable to access previous research; I have limited contact with professors and advisors; and 
my field work in the Balkans was cut short. Yet the novel coronavirus’ effect on me has been 
marginal in comparison to communities who are not so privileged. This pandemic has shed light 
on the lingering impacts of war and displacement, as those living in unstable environments (both 
politically and financially) are less likely to have the necessary means for protection and 
treatment. Although my research is specifically focused on conflict in the Balkans, I am still 
attentive to the many areas of the world that have endured mass atrocity. As today’s pandemic 
heightens the plight of marginalized communities, bear in mind that, even when this outbreak 
resolves, old challenges will persist. I therefore dedicate my writing not only to the resilient 
communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to those affected by past and current conflicts 
whose hardships are compounded by COVID-19.  
Over the past eight months, this project has taught me about the political and cultural 
history of a deeply misunderstood area of the world and the people who inhabit it. I am lucky to 
have received funding from the International Studies Department at Vassar College for field 
research in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time I spent in BiH has been invaluable to 
strengthening my knowledge of the conflict and passion for the subject matter. Having the 
opportunity to experience such a beautifully complicated and captivating country fundamentally 
changed my approach to this project, as well as how I carry myself forward. I hope that the 
images in my appendices can convey, even marginally, the striking realities of the previously 
war-torn region. Although my approach to this thesis centralizes macro-scale political and 
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judicial work, it has nonetheless sparked profound appreciation for the strength of a population 
whose struggle has been historically shaped by higher-level actors, but instead attributed to tribal 
hatreds. 
Studying the Balkans has allowed me to, in a sense, “connect the dots backwards” and 
form a comprehensive knowledge of the countless factors that shape periods of violence. I’ve 
come to understand how conflict places seemingly unrelated factors at an interplay that is not 
always visible or beneficial to peacemaking processes. I have therefore discovered the value – 
and difficulty – in finding points of connection between disparate events and political actions, 
which has in turn sharpened my uniquely critical approach to international relations, history, and 
law. As I continue to learn about the complicated relationship between IR and IL, I remain 
interested in the pursuit of global humanitarianism. I am driven to further study the difficult 
questions that ask how international legal bodies can best serve justice in the face of a political 
sphere that prioritizes domestic interests over human rights. A spectrum of advisors, professors, 
friends and family have helped me develop the skills necessary to finding progressive solutions 
to today’s outwardly unsolvable problems.  
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PART I: The Conflict  
 
“The incidents and actions that make up a life cannot be fully realized without also conveying a 
sense of place” – Anthony Everitt  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sought to deter 
human rights abuses1 and establish peace in the midst of a multiethnic, triangulated armed 
conflict that showed little to no signs of compromise. In May of 1993, the United Nations 
Security Council established the tribunal in response to the mounting human rights violations 
occurring in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the first ad hoc court created during an 
ongoing conflict, the ICTY was unprecedented. The tribunal’s unique temporal position created 
significant opportunities to deter future crimes, render justice to victims, and contribute to 
sustainable peace(making) in the Balkans. This project hence raises serious questions about the 
impact of international criminal jurisdiction on the course of armed conflicts as well as on 
peacemaking and the development of international law.  
Given the United States’ central role in tribunal creation and conflict resolution, this 
thesis uses viewpoints of multiple U.S. actors who worked closely with the ICTY in the early 
stages of its formulation. Attitudes toward the tribunal vary and rarely align between actors, so 
the following research utilizes documentary evidence to tell the story of the tribunal and its 
impacts on the war in Bosnia. I argue that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was less effective in deterring war crimes than originally intended and alternatively 
served Western policy interests in the region. The ICTY presented a token alternative to U.S. 
military intervention during the war and enabled the Clinton administration to remain virtually 
uninvolved in conflict resolution until it became financially and politically costly to do so. When 
                                               
1 Specifically, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.  
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negotiations began as a result of NATO bombing, American diplomats then used the tribunal as a 
tool to simplify negotiations by excluding Bosnian Serbs.  
A comprehensive understanding of the conflict, the tribunal, and the actors involved is 
hereby necessary to adequately analyze the ICTY’s influence on war-time politics. As uncovered 
in Chapter 1, the conflict in the Balkans was profoundly complex; an intricate history of power-
play politics and ethno-nationalism, exacerbated by political actors both globally and 
domestically, fueled violence that proliferated throughout the former Yugoslavia. Chapter 2 
exhibits how the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was equally as 
complicated in its design, philosophy, and application. The ways in which the tribunal operated 
throughout the war is a topic of contention that is addressed in Chapter 3, in which the argument 
outlined above is devised from the strongest aspects of various interpretations of the ICTY. 
Chapter 4 then illuminates the tribunal’s legacies in the development of international law and 
reflects on the relationship between politics and legal justice.  
In order to solidify and contextualize my argument, the following chapter provides a 
chronology of the Balkans conflict starting with the former Yugoslav President Joseph Broz 
Tito’s2 rise to power and ending with the Dayton Peace Agreement. The historical overview 
incorporates manifold components of conflict (i.e. international press, legal justice, military 
intervention, diplomacy) that are otherwise seen as unrelated, offering an indispensable view into 
the nuanced political landscape of the conflict that shaped the ICTY’s role in the war. A 
condensed timeline of the conflict is available for reference in Appendix 2.  
 
 
                                               
2 Hereafter referred to as Tito.  
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Historical Overview 
The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), then comprised 
of six republics and two provinces, occurred during a series of wars that took place between 
1991 and 2001 (Appendix 1). While Eastern Bloc countries sought independence from the 
Soviets, violence between warring factions ebbed and flowed during multiple Yugoslav wars that 
made for the contours of a single, nuanced armed conflict (Appendix 2). Although the Balkans’ 
diverse demographics have prompted interethnic animosity that is not exclusive to the recent 
warring period, it would be misleading to oversimplify explanations of the humanitarian crisis in 
the 1990s to tribal hatreds alone.3 Similarly, flows of violence should not be observed in only 
one direction. Initial increases in Serbian nationalism fueled human rights abuses against other 
ethnic and national groups, yet violence against “the other” was piloted by actors of all parties 
involved. While it is easy and alluring to abridge the intricacies of Balkan history, it is important 
to view the conflict from various perspectives that recognize the turmoil of the 1990s as an 
outgrowth of governmental actions and policies.  
In the midst of a post-war Europe, Tito4 transformed Yugoslavia into an autonomous, 
single-party Communist state that was independent from the regulations of the Soviet Bloc. The 
region’s autonomy from the Eastern Bloc was a direct result of ‘Titoism’ – the rejection of 
Moscow as the supreme Communist power, the refusal to make Yugoslavia a Soviet satellite 
state, and an underlying focus on regional patriotism.5 Tito’s rule is considered by many to be a 
                                               
3 The “ancient hatreds” thesis of Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History had a profound effect 
on President Clinton’s deliberations pertaining to conflict in the Balkan region. Kaplan’s argument that the Balkans 
are destined to be plagued by ceaseless, deep-rooted conflict infiltrated the minds of many and permitted a culture of 
global neglect and inaction.  
4 For the sake of brevity and clarity, I found it necessary to begin the historical backgrounding of the conflict after 
the death of Joseph Broz Tito, and continue by concentrating  on the principal occurrences throughout the country’s 
violent partition up until the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
5 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, New York: Penguin, 2005. Page 140.  
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period of ethnic harmony resulting from his constitutional blueprint, which balanced power 
among each of the Yugoslav republics.6 While true to an extent, inter-state harmony existed 
more so because of Tito’s active repression of nationalism and decentralization of power. 
Subsequently, his death on May 4th, 1980 marked a transition in Yugoslav leadership from a one-
party state to a collective presidency that left the Yugoslav population with expectations of state-
disintegration.7  
Tito’s repression, not dissolution, of ethnic grievances enabled Slobodan Milosevic’s  
rise to power within a Yugoslav state that lacked political leadership and unity. The future 
Serbian President understood that the nationalist tendencies of his people could be marshalled to 
harness political power. An arousal of nationalist sentiments during Milosevic’s visit to Kosovo 
in 1987 provided him with the mechanisms through which he would gain mass support for 
Serbian supremacy.8 Aspiring to create a larger, ethnically homogenous Serbia, Milosevic 
reinvigorated ethnic nationalisms and gained influence over the Yugoslav People’s Army.9 
Neighboring republics of Slovenia and Croatia grew wary with discontent as Milosevic ascended 
to the Serbian presidency in 1989. Within the next two years, 88.5% of Slovenian voters favored 
independence, and the legislatures of both the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia passed 
resolutions with the goal of dissolving the republics and proclaiming independence from the 
Federation.10 In referendums in December of 1990, the people of Croatia and Slovenia voted in 
                                               
6 Yugoslavia during this time consisted of a federal parliament, along with six republican parliaments and two 
provincial parliaments, that each reflected the makeup of its state. 
7 Tito imparted to Yugoslavia a collective presidency that consisted of a body of nine members who rotated yearly in 
the President of the Presidency, which governed by consensus. The Presidency selected a Prime Minister who 
served a four-year term with no independent authority. Fergus M. Bordewhich. “Yugoslavia Since Tito.” The New 
York Times, 13 April 1986. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/13/magazine/yugoslavia-since-
tito.html.  
8 Laura Silber and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1997. Page 37.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Glenn E. Curtis and Library of Congress. Yugoslavia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research 
Division, 1992.  
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favor of secession from Yugoslavia, and the two states later declared independence on the 25th of 
June, 1991.11 A ten-day war between Slovenia and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) produced 
light bloodshed and ultimately resulted in Slovenia’s withdrawal from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. War in Croatia, which started in July of 1990, was much grislier and 
more protracted. Although Croatia was granted independence in January of 1992, Croats lost 
roughly one-third of their territory and 10,000 persons, prompting the country to engage in 
territorial war until ultimate ceasefire in the Balkans in 1995.12  
The conflicts in Croatia and Slovenia were relatively bloodless affairs in comparison to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) because the two countries had ethno-religiously homogeneous 
populations with few Serbian inhabitants (Appendix 3).13 After the succession of Croatia and 
Slovenia, the neighboring republic felt increased pressure to align with, or succeed from, the 
Yugoslav State. As the most ethnically heterogeneous republic in Yugoslavia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s political domain included three major political parties, each representing one of 
the main ethno-religious communities; Croats, Bosniaks (Muslim Bosnians) and Bosnian Serbs. 
Alija Izetbegovic represented the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA) while 
Radovan Karadžić led the Bosnian Serbs (SDS), both accompanied by an adversary Croatian-
Bosnian branch called the HDZ. Bosnia’s varied political assembly gave power to each of these 
parties, and effectively represented the republic’s diverse demographic.14 But in 1992 the 
Bosnian Republic was faced with a major decision regarding independence, and its disparate 
                                               
11 M. Cherif Bassiouni. The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  
12 Uk Heo. Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO, 2007. Page 315.  
13 The vast majority of residents in Slovenia and Croatia were nationals of Catholic religion. The majority of 
residents in Serbia were nationals of Orthodox Christian religion. On the other hand, the Bosnian demographic was 
mixed between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats (Catholics), and Serbs (Orthodox Christians). See appendix 3.  
14 The Assembly was 41% Muslim, 35% Serbian, 20% Croat. Additional figures unavailable because COVID-19 
has restricted physical access to this source. Noel Malcolm. Bosnia: A Short History. NYU Press: Updated Edition, 
1 October 1996.  
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political factions inhibited unanimous decision making. Serbs maintained that it was their right to 
remain in Yugoslavia, while Croats called for independence, and Muslims sought sovereignty.15 
What ensued was a triangulation of political unrest that had inadequate, and tumultuous, 
solutions: remain in Yugoslavia and risk losing autonomy under Serb leadership or declare 
independence and risk civil war with Bosnian Serbs.   
Radovan Karadžić foretold how “it was clear that Bosnia could not survive… the Serbs 
were almost a hundred percent sure that they wanted to stay in Yugoslavia... [and] the Croats and 
Muslims were almost a hundred percent sure that they wanted to leave.”16 The President of the 
Republika Srpska seemed to have anticipated the complicated fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
By early 1992 the Serb-controlled JNA began to move into the northeastern and mountainous 
regions of Bosnia after declaring Serbian Autonomous regions (SOA’s),17 and ultimately 
announced the creation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia under the Yugoslav Federation on 
January 9.18 The Serbian Republic of Bosnia (better known as the Republika Srpska), acting to 
dissolve the coalition between the SDS, SDA and HDZ, produced the spark that ignited war in 
the spring of 1992. Fighting erupted between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats along the 
Neretva River in Bosanski Brod on March 22, 1992.19  
The Republika Srpska began shelling Sarajevo on April 6, 1992 after the European 
Community formally recognized Bosnia as an independent state. Karadžić responded by naming 
himself as head of the Bosnian Serb state, with Sarajevo as the Republic’s new capital.  
                                               
15 Laura Silber and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1997. Page 211.  
16 Ibid, 220.   
17 Serbian Autonomous Regions, or SOAs, were Serb-inhabited areas within Bosnia and Croatia that were 
proclaimed as the autonomous districts under the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, later the Republika Srpska.  
18 Laura Silber and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1997. Page 218.  
19 Misha Glenny. The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. Penguin Books: Edition 3, 1996. Page 167.  
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Under the command of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, the JNA – alongside other paramilitary 
groups – helped Karadžić gain control of the city by surrounding Sarajevo and cutting off supply 
lines in a successful effort to starve the city. (Appendix 4). Resultingly, militias from Muslim, 
Croat, and Serbian communities fought for control and territory throughout Bosnia. With no 
single command structure for Bosnian militant groups, Sarajevo was reduced to rubble in the 
midst of indiscriminate mortar attacks and unrelenting violence that remains as the longest 
military siege in the history of modern warfare (1992-1996) (Appendix 5A.).20 
In an interview with a Sarajevan tour guide, the anonymous interlocutor recounted how 
“psychologically it was hard to accept” the realities of war, such as “risking your life to receive 
water from breweries or food from humanitarian aid stations… and having no electricity or 
gas.”21 He described how active snipers were littered throughout buildings and, at the height of 
the siege, more than 3,000 shells fell upon the city a day (Appendix 5B.).22 Staggering reports of 
Sarajevan casualties during the siege incentivized the first international intervention on behalf of 
the UN Security Council (UNSC). UNSC Resolution 757, adopted May 30, 1992, implemented 
economic sanctions that restricted the flow of goods into and out of Yugoslavia with the 
exception of humanitarian aid.23 The siege of Sarajevo marked the beginning of fierce press 
coverage on the Balkan wars, which pressured political administrations and higher level 
international bodies to intervene. Although prodded to protect human rights, the George H. W. 
Bush administration and NATO were averse to military intervention, especially given the 
                                               
20 Laura Silber and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1997. Page 234.  
21 Breweries, which held silos of water underground, were often the sole source of water for citizens during the siege 
because water and power lines were sabotaged by Bosnian Serb forces in an attempt to starve the city.  
22 Anonymous. Interview by Jordan Moss. Personal and Historical Interview. Sarajevo, Bosnia, 9 March 2020. Fact 
checked citation: United Nations. “Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo – Part 1/10. UN Commission of 
Experts: S/1994/674/Add. 2, 27 May 1994. Available: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20010222115037/http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/VI-01.htm#I.H 
23 UN Security Council. Security Council Resolution 757. S/RES/757, 30 May 1992. Available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2122c.html.   
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upcoming U.S. Presidential election period in fall of 1992.24 President Bush, similar to other 
NATO actors, refused to deploy troops into Bosnia in order to advance domestic interests and 
remain outside the bounds of conflict. Instead, members of the UNSC began organizing the 
ICTY as an alternative interventionist measure that would appease humanitarian protests. Yet, 
despite these efforts to halt the bloodshed occurring in Sarajevo, the city, along with many of its 
sister regions, endured mass violence until the conflict’s resolution.  
Bosnian Serb military strategy aimed to create a “Greater Serbia” by connecting Serbian 
enclaves in Bosnia and Croatia to the Republic of Serbia.25 Defense expert Paul Beaver explains 
how General Mladić, the commander of Bosnian Serb forces, pushed for the “consolidation of 
Serb-held territories…, the eradication of Muslim enclaves within them such as Gorazde, and the 
severance of… military links between Muslims in Bosnia and those in the Sandzak area of 
Serbia.”26 Etničko čis ćenje, or ethnic cleansing, was the term used to describe this ongoing 
systematization of mass atrocity.27 Although not coined at the time, “atrocity crimes” is an 
umbrella term that encompasses genocide, crimes against humanity (including ethnic cleansing) 
and war crimes.28 All factions of the conflict perpetrated these large scale atrocity crimes, but 
cleansing campaigns were primarily conducted by Croats and Serbs, most often against Muslim 
                                               
24 President George H. W. Bush served as the 41st President of the United States from January of 1989 until January 
of 1993. Bill Clinton beat President Bush in the fall election period of 1992 and assumed the role of President of the 
United States in January of 1993.  
25 UN Security Council. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992). S/1994/674, 27 May 1994. Available at: 
https://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf.  
26 Roger Cohen. Serbian General Who Calls the Shots: Determined and Calling West’s Bluff. N.Y. TIMES, 17 April 
1994. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/17/world/conflict-balkans-serbian-strategy-serbian-general-
who-calls-shots-determined.html.  
27 Ethnic cleansing has not been recognized as an independent crime under international law and has no concrete 
definition. A UN Commission of Experts defines ethnic cleansing as “… … a purposeful policy designed by one 
ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or 
religious group from certain geographic areas.” UN Security Council. Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). S/1994/674, 27 May 1994. 
28 David Scheffer. Genocide and Atrocity Crimes. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 
1: Iss. 3: Article 3, 2006.  
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communities. Of the two, Serb forces were more regimented in their crusade and initially 
concentrated assaults in the Northwest of Bosnia near Banja Luka and the Drina Valley.29 
Cleansing campaigns during the early years of conflict were swift and unrestrained due to the 
lack of a tangible threat, viz. military deployment, on behalf of the Bush administration. Given 
President Bush’s focus on re-election and the ICTY’s lack of arrest mechanisms, Serbian war 
criminals felt emboldened to continue such violence.  
Ethnic cleansing came in various forms. The early stages of Mladić’s purge ensured that 
Muslim lives crumbled to the point of collapse; they were fired from jobs, their houses and 
businesses attacked, and they were prohibited from traveling by car or making phone calls.30 
Many were forced to sign over their rights to property as they fled their homes. Floods of 
refugees moved through Bosnia’s mountainous terrain towards “safer” regions in Croatia and 
Slovenia.31 International press coverage was nearsighted, focusing only on the siege of Sarajevo. 
Thus an increasing number of refugee encampments went unnoticed by the international 
community, which, in turn vastly underrepresented the extent of ethnic cleansing during the war. 
As stories of detention camps in northern Bosnia were under-circulated in comparison to 
coverage on Sarajevo, the Sava and Drina Rivers became home to various prison facilities for 
non-Serb civilians (Appendix 6). These camps fulfilled purposes “such as mass killing, torture 
[and] rape,” and played a central role in the stratagem of ethnic cleansing.32 Major recognition of 
mass atrocity did not occur until Roy Gutman, an American journalist, shed light on the extent of 
                                               
29 These areas were highly concentrated with Bosnian Serbs, making it easier to consolidate power and gain control 
over the territory. In turn, controlling this territory would allow Serbian forces to link Serb-controlled areas of 
Croatia and Bosnia with the larger Serbian Republic.  
30 Samantha A. Power. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Perennial, 2003. Print. 
Page 250.  
31 Migration throughout the war was extremely dangerous and taxing. Thousands of Bosnian refugees were slain by 
snipers and landmines, or died from exhaustion, as they attempted to escape onslaughts of violence.  
32 M. Cherif Bassiouni. The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Transnational 
Publishers, 1996. Page 60.  
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human strife in Bosnia after visiting the Manjača camp and interviewing Muslim prisoners. 
Gutman’s continuous reporting on the conditions and realities of the Omarska and Keraterm 
camps eventually unleashed a torrent of international outrage that called for immediate 
intervention.33  
Global responses to the ongoing crisis in Yugoslavia up to this moment were limited; the 
international community’s high-level actors and non-governmental bodies did have a presence in 
the conflict, but their impact was narrow. The United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and similar 
organizations published reports on the ongoing crisis that emphasized the sadistic nature of 
humanitarian abuses.34 What resulted was the implementation of the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR), UN Safe areas, Resolution 757, and the ICTY, all of which enabled the 
international community to veil protracted inaction with humanitarian charades.35 Silber & Little 
summarize how, until military action was taken, Western tactics for aid “enthusiastically 
[addressed] the symptoms of conflict, without making any real effort to challenge its causes.”36 
As the number of displaced people rose to over 1 million by mid-July of 1993,37 Bosnian and 
Croat political leaders called for Western actors’ or NATO military intervention. Unfortunately, 
requests for forceful intervention from the international community were swept under the rug 
and continuously overshadowed by domestic political interests.  
                                               
33 Samantha A. Power. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Perennial, 2003. Print. 
Page 275 – 277.  
34 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - The former Yugoslav Republics, 1 January 
1993, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca72a.html.  
35 It should be acknowledged that these “charades” of humanitarian aid were still of good use in some cases and did 
make an impact on the amount of lives that were saved (although UN Safe Areas were ultimately harmful). In 
general, the tactics for humanitarian aid strategies were utilized for far too long as an alternative to military 
intervention.  
36 Laura Silber and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1997. Page 256.  
37 Ibid, 252. Footnote 7. Exact source information is unattainable due to COVID-19 restrictions.  
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Secretary of State James Baker explains that the U.S. government and policymakers 
initially argued that “it was time to make the Europeans step up… and show that they could act 
as a unified power” after World War II.38 The situation in Bosnia was no different; to the 
American administration, conflict resolution in the Balkans should be a European obligation. 
American foreign policy specialists under the Bush and Clinton administrations believed that the 
U.S. should focus on a narrow collection of economic and security interests that did not include 
Bosnia’s “civil war.”39 Occupied by Desert Storm and the death throes of the Soviet Union, the 
Bush administration was wary of entanglement in yet another crisis.40 American national 
interests deterred the administration from involvement in 1992. As James Baker claimed, “we 
don’t have a dog in that fight.” But the Post-Cold War European community was still incapable 
of acting unilaterally and made no effort to pursue military intervention until it was driven by the 
U.S. and NATO in 1994. In the meantime, international efforts to placate the region’s violence 
emerged through noncombatant, humanitarian means like UN Safe Areas and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  
Serbs thus continued to fight a territorial war in aims of expanding religiously and 
ethnically homogenous terrain. By the end of 1993, Serbian forces controlled over seventy 
percent of Bosnian territory, leaving Croats and Muslims to quarrel over the remaining land.41 
Cyclical attacks and reprisals between Muslims and Croats continued to weaken overall defense 
against the Serb forces. Triangulated tensions between these warring groups diminished the 
likelihood for ceasefire agreements, particularly due to the difficulty in dividing territory 
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satisfactorily between opposing groups. As fighting progressed in 1994, there was mounting 
pressure on President Clinton to effectuate peace in the Balkans. The administration was poised 
to do so to countervail its recent failure in preventing the Rwandan genocide. Additionally, a 
second wave of neoconservatism added to the pressure for stronger peace-based foreign policy 
initiatives. Both factors made the cessation of violence between Bosniaks and Croats a necessary 
political strategy for the American administration to foster peace in the region.  
The first step towards reaching this goal, and brokering a legitimate peace arrangement, 
was made when Bosniak and Croat forces agreed to federation and ceasefire in March of 1994. 
Under the auspices of Clinton and his administration, the Washington Agreement was signed by 
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Bosnian 
Croat Representative Kresmir Zubak.42 Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic later 
initialed the agreement to the confederation, which established the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the Croat and Bosniak majority areas. Given that the plan arose from American 
interests in strengthening Bosnia’s potential for ceasefire, many believed that it was a quid pro 
quo arrangement.43 By agreeing to the truce, the American administration implied the likelihood 
of lift-and-strike policies (“lift” the arms embargo and “strike” militarily) against Bosnian Serbs 
and permitted Croatia and Bosnia “to circumvent the arms embargo… and change the military 
situation.”44 Regardless of carrots and sticks, the resulting agreement diminished hostilities 
between the two groups and facilitated allied efforts against Bosnian Serbs in warring and 
peacemaking contexts.  
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The war continued to take thousands of lives, and displace thousands more, throughout 
1994. The siege of Sarajevo captured the majority of international attention. However, perhaps 
the most egregious events of the war unfolded outside of the capital city, partially due to faulty 
humanitarian aid tactics. As an alternative to militarized assistance, the implementation of UN 
“safe areas” entailed the demilitarization of ethnic enclaves that were meant to protect civilians, 
most often Bosniaks, in Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia. In reality, these territories paved the 
way for the unarmed concentration of ethnic groups that were then “starved out,” similar to 
Sarajevo, or cleansed from Bosnian Serb regions. The so-called safe areas had become, as 
President Izetbegovic noted, “the most unsafe [places] in the world,” as exemplified by the 
massacre of Srebrenica.  
Srebrenica, a small town in the eastern region of the Republika Srpska, served as a place 
of refuge for Muslims throughout the war. As an extremely Muslim-concentrated enclave under 
which UNPROFOR offered virtually no military protection, Srebrenica was a sitting duck for 
Bosnian Serb cleansing campaigns. In July of 1995,  after months of struggling to protect the 
enclave, Dutch peacekeepers vacated the region as a safety measure in response to a Serbian 
ultimatum to evacuate the city.45 General Ratko Mladić led Serb offensives into Srebrenica over 
the coming days, subjecting Muslim civilians to continuous shelling and detainment. Flocks of 
refugees fled while the Serbian forces attempted to cleanse the city. On July 13th, Bosnian Serbs 
began moving thousands of Bosniak men and boys into rural regions north of the city. The fates 
of such men were initially unknown by the international community until aerial CIA surveillance 
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systems spotted mass grave sites around Srebrenica. 46 Later legally deemed genocide, 
approximately 8,000 men and boys had been slaughtered and buried in remote fields and 
warehouses. 47 (Appendix 5C). Evidence of mass burials in areas like Čarakovo and Tomasica 
shook the international community to its core as more people became aware of the largest mass 
murder since World War II.48 The fall of Srebrenica marked a turning point in the war. 
International actors were left no choice but to cross what General Sir Michael Rose calls the 
Mogadishu line, the demarcation between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement.49  
As “safe areas” continued to fall, unity between Western powers seemingly began to rise. 
Shuttle diplomacy began as Richard Holbrooke and his team spearheaded peace talks between 
the Croats, Bosnians and Serbs, although America’s diplomatic efforts gained limited traction in 
their beginning stages. A mortar attack on the 28th of August, 1995 killed 34 people in Sarajevo’s 
open-air marketplace and proved to be the last straw before Western military and diplomatic 
intervention gained momentum (Appendix 5D). NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb positions 
around Sarajevo on August 30, 1995 in its largest military action in history – Operation 
Deliberate Force (ODF).50 International press coverage was enthusiastic about the West’s first 
use of force and reported how the long overdue attacks finally gave American and NATO forces 
the credibility they needed to “[sustain] the diplomatic initiative now under way.”51 Shuttle 
diplomacy commenced after the signing of the Patriarch Paper, which established Milosevic as 
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the individual authority to negotiate for indicted Bosnian Serbs.52 Leveraged by the ICTY’s 
indictments against Mladić and Karadžić, the agreement fundamentally changed the dynamic of 
negotiations by disregarding Bosnian Serb voices and centralizing Milosevic’s need for lifted 
economic sanctions.53   
Holbrooke, now backed by the threat of credible force and economic sanctions, 
understood that the warring period was ripe with potential for a ceasefire and a negotiated 
settlement. Increased military cooperation between Bosnian and Croatian forces led to territorial 
gains in the summer of 1995 that, in conjunction with the subsequent NATO bombings, “gave 
[the Clinton administration] an avenue to a quicker diplomatic resolution.”54Although the 
mapping aspect of negotiation took painstakingly long during the Dayton summit, most 
overriding territorial issues were essentially decided as a result of the Western Offensive.55 After 
a short ceasefire period, sustained NATO bombing in September of 1995 finally pushed the 
Serbs to accept NATO and the UN’s demands within an agreed timeframe. The resulting 
framework of the negotiated settlement at Dayton resolved the key issues on the table:  
Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to exist as a single state within its 
current boundaries. Bosnia would consist of two parts, the Muslim-Croat Federation and 
the Republika Srpska, and land would be allocated respectively at 51 and 49 percent of 
Bosnia. The government would be a three member presidency and parliamentary 
assembly, and would have authority over foreign relations, trade and other international 
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policies. Refugees and internally displaced people would have the right to return to their 
homes or be compensated for loss of property.56   
 
The peace agreement reached at the Wright-Patterson Airforce base near Dayton, 
Ohio was formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 and concluded the three-and-a-
half year war in Bosnia.57 It was made possible by the changing tide of international 
engagement that arrived in undulations of military bombardment and diplomatic rigor in 
the latter half of 1995. As the price of inactivity rose before Dayton, Clinton’s policy of 
containment and disengagement became unsustainable. Operation Deliberate Force 
marked not only a turning point in the war, but also in how American actors employed 
the ICTY. Before bombing, the tribunal was a means for pushing back intervention, 
whereas later it was a tool for excluding Bosnian Serbs from the Dayton summit. The 
exploitation of the ICTY as an apparatus for policy was enabled by its intrinsically 
political construction. In view of this, the next chapter will outline the basic structure, 
intended functions and philosophies of the ICTY at its outset in order to convey the 
politics of its creation and application.   
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PART II: Creation of the Tribunal  
 
“In criticizing the law one serves justice.” – Jurist Dalloz   
 
From before Slovenia’s secession in 1991 to the Dayton agreement in 1995, armed 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia attracted a plethora of international and domestic actors that 
attempted to quell the ongoing violence. While some succeeded and many failed, it was not until 
1993 that cries for legal justice in the Balkans resulted in the formation of a tribunal for the 
prosecution of war crimes. Given the degree to which humanitarian abuse occurred during the 
conflict, decisive action was necessary to deter criminals from committing future crimes, render 
justice to victims, and promote peace in the region.58 Yugoslavia marked the first time in history 
that an ad hoc war crimes tribunal was created during the course of a conflict when UN Security 
Council Resolution 827 was signed into effect in February of 1993. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established pursuant to the UN Charter’s 
Chapter VII authority.59 American actors in particular, such as Madeleine Albright, David 
Scheffer, and John Shattuck, propelled the project forward in the UNSC in order to make the 
ICTY a reality. In response to the region’s intricate and calculated violence, the tribunal set out 
to prosecute individuals from all ethnic and national parties who had committed war crimes from 
1991 onward.  
This was the first time since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that a court would 
attempt to hold individuals of any status responsible for the perpetration of atrocities during 
wartime.60 The formation of the ICTY was generally greeted with optimism, but not without 
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some contention. Those responsible for its construction encountered both structural and 
philosophical debates about the court’s legal authority, integrity, and structure. The tribunal was 
unique in its creation, marrying aspects of previous military tribunals with new legal 
foundations. After lengthy disputes between various state actors, namely over the permanent 
judges, head prosecutor, and organizational structure, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia materialized in 1993. Although assessments of the tribunal vary, the ICTY 
undoubtedly established a unique legal structure for prosecuting war criminals as well as a 
foundation for the development of future ad hoc criminal tribunals.   
As war intensified in Croatia and Slovenia, increasing ethnic and religious nationalism 
led to an onslaught of violence. By the end of 1992, international actors such as the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission and the International Committee for the Red Cross began to 
identify breaches in international humanitarian law occurring in Yugoslavia.61 Helsinki Watch 
reported that Serbs in the region “systematically violated the most basic tenets set forth in 
international human rights documents” and called for national courts to “investigate, prosecute 
and punish those responsible.”62 Requests for national prosecution gained little traction because 
of the probability of noncompliance on behalf of Yugoslav states, and therefore drove the 
international community to brainstorm ideas for alternative judicial action. Proposals for 
international prosecution gained momentum as Roy Gutman’s images of detention camps 
generated public outcry that drew parallels between Yugoslavia and the Holocaust.63 The need 
for justice in the Balkans was answered when the UN Security Council launched the 
                                               
61 Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf. An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. The Journal of National Security Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995.   
62 Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992.” Yugoslavia, 1992, 
www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1992/yugoslvia/.  
63 Roy Gutman. “Serbs Have Slain Over 1,000 in 2 Bosnia Camps, Ex-Prisoners Say.” Los Angeles Times, 2 
August, 1992, www.latime.come/archives/la-xpm-1992-08-02-mn-5646-story.html 
 26 
Commission to Investigate War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia.64 From this point forward, 
various individuals and organizations affirmed that a second Nuremberg would await the 
perpetrators of ethnic cleansing,65 leading to the approval of UNSC Resolution 808 that initiated 
collaboration between member states in drafting the tribunal’s statute.66  
Justifications for the creation of the ICTY under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter were met with varying responses. Chapter VII permits the Security Council to respond to 
threats of peace, breaches of peace, and the maintenance of peace, but nowhere is “there an 
explicit authority to build criminal tribunals.”67 Critics of the tribunal’s UNSC legislative 
foundation predominately argued for establishment by treaty, which would provide states with 
choice in consenting to the obligations of the tribunal. Other states, like Mexico and France, 
proposed that the General Assembly (GA) partake in drafting and reviewing statutes.68 These 
alternative bases for authority had potential benefits but also had several disadvantages 
pertaining to efficiency and authority. Formulation by treaty or the inclusion of the GA would 
add lengthy phases of negotiation and ratification that would hinder the pace at which the 
tribunal would be created. Additionally, sovereignty provided by the treaty approach 
complicated multilateral ratifications and the uncertainty of state membership was antithetical to 
the effectiveness and urgency of adjudication. The ICTY as a subsidiary organ of the Security 
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Council thus enabled swifter decision making that ensured all states were liable under its 
authority.69  
 Under Security Council authority, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia both deviated from and mirrored its predecessors in a few fundamental ways. The 
ICTY is often deemed the first true international crimes tribunal because it enforces international 
humanitarian law on behalf of all member states in the Security Council, as opposed to the small 
number of states who enforced the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.70 Creators of the ICTY, such 
as Madeleine Albright and John Shattuck, hastened its formulation in order to establish the 
tribunal during the conflict, as opposed to Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that prosecuted the 
defeated party’s nationals post-conflict. In doing so, the ICTY aimed to deter criminals from war 
crimes and render justice to victims in order to promote peace in the former Yugoslavia.71 The 
Yugoslav tribunal borrowed a necessary mechanism of international justice from Nuremberg and 
Tokyo: legal primacy over domestic courts.72 Both the United Nations’ and United States’ 
proposals to the Security Council promoted primacy of the tribunal.73 Judicial power over 
domestic courts was fundamental to the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal in 
Yugoslavia because of the limited likelihood for adequate prosecution of war criminals in the 
region.   
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 State impunity, or the notion of a “victors tribunal,” was rejected by the Security 
Council.74 Any person who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided… in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime” would be held responsible for their actions.75 The 
web of ethno-nationalist tensions within the conflict generated breaches of humanitarian law by 
actors on all sides, obliging the tribunal to place criminal charges upon people from all 
backgrounds given viable legal evidence.76 Although the majority of punishments were placed 
upon Serbs – a statistic with seemingly political undertones – data on the ICTY exhibits how the 
tribunal followed a just legal model based on gravity of crimes, levels of responsibility, and 
chain of command.77 Equitable prosecution also required the imposition of superior 
responsibility, which claims that crimes committed by a subordinate do not relieve their superior 
from criminal responsibility.78 The ICTY considers superior responsibility as a central facet to its 
adjudication because it demonstrates “that an individual’s senior position can no longer protect 
them from prosecution.”79 The decision to uphold superior responsibility was tirelessly backed 
by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as a means through which international law could 
reveal to the world that those who instigate violence would be held accountable on an individual 
basis.80  
 With the victors-trying-the-vanquished model forsaken, architects of the International 
Criminal Tribunal aimed for a collaborative production of legal structures on behalf of “the 
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entire international community pursuant to the authority of the United Nations.”81 The tribunal’s 
Manual on Developed Practices explicitly argues how “the international community, and not just 
the war-time victors, acted to establish a tribunal for prosecuting persons in order to deter the 
commission of further crimes.”82 While deterrence was relatively weak, the Yugoslav tribunal 
was effectively fulfilling its aim of global interconnectivity and fairness. Yet it is important to 
note that the ICTY was driven forward by members of the UNSC like the United States. The 
international community’s inclusionary model was limited to major powers, which ensured that 
the most basic aspects of its structure were aligned with the interests of international actors 
within the Council. In turn, higher-level political actors had more agency to shape the tribunal, 
and later utilize it to their own benefit.  
The adoption of Resolution 827 established the constitutional structure and authority on 
which the tribunal initiated and operated a search to fill positions within the court. As opposed to 
Nuremberg, the Yugoslav tribunal’s search for judges was lengthy and arduous due to 
requirements of unanimous approval between the states sitting on the Security Council and 
General Assembly. Election processes were extensive; a state could propose two candidates for 
the position of permanent judge and the General Assembly would elect a maximum of 16 judges 
by majority vote. Permanent judges would serve for four years and would then be eligible for re-
election.83 The Secretary-General noted that “due account should be taken of the experience of 
the judges in criminal law, international law… and human rights law.”84 In regards to elected 
officials, governments like Russia and the U.S. each had specific demands that lead to disputes 
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about a range of individuals from diverse backgrounds. One major request was from Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, who ardently insisted that “[the United States] is… determined to see 
that women jurists sit on the tribunal and that women prosecutors bring war criminals to 
justice.”85 Generally, the United States was a well-respected driving force in the structuring of 
the tribunal, and Albright’s pleas were answered when American Gabrielle McDonald was 
elected along with “one other woman and nine men, each from a different country.”86  
Finding an acceptable prosecutor for the tribunal proved much more challenging than 
filling roles for judges. Prosecutors were tasked with “investigation and prosecution,” including 
the responsibility of clarifying issues of law, procedure and evidence.87 And so, with the 
requirement of a unanimous vote looming, the fifteen-member Security Council was caught in a 
tug-of-war trying to find the “perfect” prosecutor. Conflicting political interests thwarted the 
search process and impaired the ICTY’s ability to deliver timely, credible threats before Dayton. 
The UNSC worked to resolve disputes, including but not limited to Russia’s blocking of NATO-
country candidates or Muslims, and so it wasn’t until June of 1994 that Richard Goldstone was 
selected as a valid candidate.88 An international lawyer without NATO ties or previous ties to the 
Balkans, Goldstone fulfilled the Council’s requirements and was unanimously sworn in by 
UNSC Resolution 936 after approximately a year of searching.89 The extended period of time 
taken for appointment processes sheds lights on the many political considerations that shaped the 
tribunal, as well as their adverse impact on delivering credible threat and deterrence.   
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 A second but no less important issue was the organization and judicial structure of the 
tribunal. Multiple proposals concerning the court’s structure were submitted to the UNSC. The 
United States’ draft proposal included a trial court with three panels, an appeals court and an 
independent chief prosecutor, all of which would be appointed by the Security Council.90 This 
draft charter was ultimately rejected, and instead the UN Secretary General’s proposal of two 
trial chambers, an appeals chamber elected by the General Assembly, and a prosecutor appointed 
by the Security Council was accepted.91 The Secretary General’s proposal, as opposed to the 
United States’, ensured that each position was appointed by a global authority, again adhering to 
the internationally cooperative characteristic of the tribunal. The structure of the court also 
granted the Trial and Appeals chambers with legal agency, as each was influenced by the 
jurisprudence of its judges. Such agency was integral to the Yugoslav tribunal’s unprecedented 
decision to blend properties of different legal traditions, namely between common and civil 
law.92 Legal decisions were thus formed in a comparative system that catered to the distinctive 
needs of each case, and later used as a template for the ad hoc tribunals of Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone.   
 The scope of jurisdiction of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals included crimes against 
peace, crimes against humanity and persecution on religious, political or racial grounds.93 In 
comparison, the ICTY outlined in its statute a list of violations that are included in the court’s 
jurisdiction, explicitly mentioning breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws 
                                               
90 M. Cherif Bassiouni. The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Transnational 
Publishers, 1996. 
91 UN Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808. UN Doc. S/25704. 1993. New York: UN, 3 May 1993.  
92 Thomas W. Pittman. International Justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
American Bar Association. Vol. 5, Issue 3. 2016.  
93 United Nations. Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945.  
 32 
and customs of war, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity.94 Yugoslavia built upon 
the previous military tribunal’s jurisdiction by introducing the crimes of torture, detention and 
rape into international criminal law.95 As a whole, the International Criminal Tribunal extended 
the definition of war crimes while also disbanding head-of-state immunity. Additionally, the 
court reserved the right to create and amend rules of procedure and evidence when needed. As 
Article 15 specifies, “the judges… shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct… 
of appropriate matters.” Judge Meron summarizes this aspect of the tribunal well when stating 
that “[in] a sense, the Security Council was the legislature,” and rules of procedure are frequently 
amended to fulfill the tribunal’s goal of personifying international justice and collective 
conscience.96    
 The culmination of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s 
structure, philosophy and stratagem provided the UN court of justice with the ability to influence 
the nature of war in the Balkans. While the ICTY had an apparatus for deterrence and justice, it 
lacked the extensive financial support97 necessary to enforce indictments or make arrests during 
its early years. The structure of the tribunal was shaped by political considerations that also 
prolonged its procurement period. Before the Dayton agreement, these pitfalls had a direct effect 
on its credibility in the eyes of war criminals Mladić or Karadžić. As discussed in the next 
chapter, deterrence was minimal before the ceasefire in 1995. Yet the tribunal’s legacies on the 
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development of international law are far reaching into the present day and continue to inform 
justice initiatives in war-torn areas. Recognizing the philosophical foundations of the tribunal’s 
structure and conception shed light on the influence that state actors, especially those on the 
Security Council, have on international courts, as well as the subsequent repercussions of such 
political influence.  
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PART III: The Tug of War between Peace and Justice  
 
“History is often made of seemingly disparate events whose true relationship to one another 
becomes apparent only after the fact.” – Richard Holbrooke  
 
 Philosophical underpinnings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia afford observers a basis for understanding the intentions and goals of the ad hoc 
court. The number of motives for pursuing prosecution of Yugoslav war criminals is congruent 
to the manifold contributors to its creation and implementation, offering insight to the 
complicated relationship between the tribunal’s aims and impacts. Individuals ranging from the 
same and opposing administrations hold different views regarding the court’s influence on 
conflict resolution. Yet questions pertaining to the impact of the ICTY on the conflict before 
Dayton remain relatively unanswered. An array of prominent actors under the Clinton 
administration have written about their experiences with the ICTY, ranging from establishment 
to implementation. Therefore, in order to take a concrete stance on the subject, it is necessary to 
engage with various personal, historical and political perspectives. The following section will 
offer a synopsis of the differing views held by actors who worked closely with the tribunal in 
order to provide a holistic understanding of its functions and effectiveness. The second section of 
this chapter will then analyze these individual accounts and devise a culminating assessment of 
the ICTY’s role in the Balkans.  
 
Conflicting Accounts  
 The quest for justice by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals proved less challenging than 
the struggle for international accountability that unfolded in the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY in 
particular had no basis on which to model its mid-war behavior, making some of its uncharted 
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activity contentious. Although some believed that political activity would thwart the 
effectiveness of international jurisdiction, others like the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
Madeleine Albright, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, John Shattuck, 
recognized international criminal tribunals’ potential for effective deterrence. Many instrumental 
actors in the development and application of the ICTY were Americans who optimistically 
viewed the tribunal as a means through which justice could be delivered for the cultivation of 
peace. Madeleine Albright, the leading advocate for the ICTY, made “the tribunal a top issue in 
all… bilateral relationships with governments… in and outside the region.”98 She argues how her 
faith in the tribunal was crucial to American involvement in Bosnia, stating that the ICTY 
deterred criminals from committing future crimes and “built a strong case of law upon which 
future prosecutions for crimes against humanity… may be built.”99 Albright’s teammate John 
Shattuck mirrors her sanguine outlook.  
Shattuck describes how the tribunal had a rough start; the project was underfunded as few 
were willing to push it forward.100 He acknowledges the argument that the United States created 
the tribunal in order to “assuage the guilt of those who are on the inside feeling frustrated,” a 
valid view in light of increased press coverage during the war. 101 Yet Shattuck counteracts these 
arguments by noting how the tribunal became more than a paper institution around 1994 when it 
transformed into a political instrument.102 Investigatory work and indictments allowed state 
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actors like Richard Holbrooke to leverage himself in negotiations with Milosevic, especially 
after the Serbian President continuously denied control over Bosnian Serbs. In Shattuck’s view, 
the information presented to Milosevic on Serbian war crimes “gave Holbrooke the… credibility 
to threaten more bombing, or… another indictment.”103 Albright and Shattuck complement one 
another in their view that the tribunal’s investigative work granted U.S. interests with credible 
threat, and thus pushed Bosnian Serbs to reduce their infliction of human rights abuses. While 
the argument regarding diplomatic leverage is well-founded, the tribunal’s slow start contradicts 
the notion of deterrence that Albright and Shattuck promote.  
 Not all participants in the development of the ICTY felt so confident about its potential to 
positively shape the conduct and outcome of the war. Professor Cherif Bassiouni served as 
chairman of the UNSC Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in the former 
Yugoslavia (1992-1994), and was involved in the adoption of the ICTY’s statute. As Bassiouni 
developed the tribunal, he specified that its “existence will depend on whether it will be able to 
achieve some justice and engender some deterrence.”104 With the goals of justice and deterrence 
in mind, he was cognizant of the heavy role that perception of the tribunal would play in 
generating deterrence.105 Bassiouni was aware of the negative perceptions taken towards the 
tribunal at the time of its conception; many viewed the tribunal as a disruption to ongoing 
negotiations. Members of the Security Council additionally argued against the propriety of the 
tribunal in light of the current political considerations, however, the need for quick action 
ultimately induced members to accept the statute.106 Although Bassiouni was confident that the 
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ICTY contributed to “the restoration and the maintenance of peace,” he recognized that the 
expedited pace at which the tribunal was created inevitably caused mistakes, misuses and 
delays.107  
 David Scheffer, senior adviser to Albright and later Clinton’s Ambassador-at-large for 
war crimes, also played a major role in constructing the Yugoslav tribunal. The American lawyer 
and diplomat is pragmatic in his interpretation of the tribunal, and is refreshingly candid about 
how he strives to better understand the implications of the failures and achievements of what he 
calls “credible justice.”108 Scheffer embodies the reality that people working towards the same 
cause can have entirely different analyses of its impacts. Operating directly under Albright, 
Scheffer contended with deterrence: would creating a tribunal actually deter the actions of war 
criminals?  In the ICTY’s lifetime, Scheffer felt he had to “prove a negative,” and found that 
deterrence is a “bizarrely twisted objective fraught with inflated expectations and unpredictable 
outcomes.”109 He faintly mirrors Albright’s optimism that countries consumed by atrocity can 
learn deterrence, yet is more cynical. Scheffer’ recognizes that while enterprise in the quest for 
Yugoslav justice lies in the tribunal’s deterrent potential, tangible judicial threats did not 
materialize soon, or firmly, enough.110  
 During the first three years of violence in the Balkans, few tangible judicial threats 
existed, as the period following the tribunal’s establishment was characterized by sluggish 
development and troubleshooting. When taken together, the lack of direct consequences for state 
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actors and the tribunal’s slow start belittled the deterrent effect of the ICTY. Declarations against 
the competency of the tribunal by officials in the FRY, SRBiH and RSK speak to the scant 
respect paid towards the judicial entity.111 Samantha Power claims that the tribunal never reached 
its deterrent potential because it lacked the enforcement abilities to legitimize deterrent threats. 
The lengthy processes of trial and error that the tribunal underwent in its beginning stages 
signified the UN body’s lack of authority or intent to punish those responsible. Judicial inaction 
during the majority of the conflict made for “missed opportunities to deter,” and the ensuing 
silence of the international community could be interpreted as “consent or even support” of 
genocide.112  
 Power’s A Problem from Hell reinforces how the United States’ and United Nations’ 
approaches to the ICTY were often neglectful and focused on removing the crisis from global 
headlines rather than punishing crimes.113 Coverage of Bosnian concentration camps struck a 
chord in the public that led to increased cries for Western action. Of the many strategies 
demanded by international communities, military intervention was favored alongside 
jurisprudence. Establishing an international war crimes tribunal was hence seen as a token 
alternative to the tougher choice of military intervention, which the U.S. worked actively against. 
In this sense, the ICTY was a low-cost, low-risk substitute for military measures that would 
subdue public interests and appeal to voters.114 In connection to Misha Glenny’s argument that 
the United States and NATO used humanitarian means to address symptoms of conflict but not 
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their root causes, the “softer” option of the ICTY gave Western powers an alibi for prolonged 
inaction.115  
The ICTY’s limited capacity for direct judicial action in its youth phases also enabled 
global superpowers to veil their idleness. Power and Scheffer concurrently argue how the drawn-
out “search for certainty” of war crimes allowed government officials to prolong inaction under 
the guise that legal justice was on its way.116 Instead of aggressively searching for pertinent 
evidence, American bureaucrats turned a blind eye to investigations in order to shelter national 
interests from the implications of full-fledged involvement. The tribunal allowed them to claim 
that they were, in some fashion, intervening in Bosnia, even though it was a hollow threat. 
Clinton often cited the tribunal as a crucial initiative in Yugoslav policy processes, but failed to 
discuss other enforcement options (military, economic or diplomatic) under the pretexts of 
“policies and circumstances that coexisted with the Yugoslav Tribunal.”117 His recognition of the 
ICTY as vital to Balkan peace shows that Clinton understood the tribunal’s futility, and instead 
used it as a tool for pushing back the intervention timeline. Various authors have linked the 
Western alliance’s militant cowardice to its abuse of the ICTY as a “crutch upon which… [it 
eased] its conscience.”118 Essentially, the moral justifications that originally undergirded the 
tribunal were quietly written off and used as a scapegoat for the West’s lack of decisive military 
action.  
Not only did the tribunal provide an alternative to military involvement, it also delayed 
peace processes in the region. NATO’s unwillingness to intervene militarily was warranted by 
judicial lip-service, and true peace negotiations began only after NATO began bombing in 
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August of 1995.119 Operation Deliberate Force was the first military response taken by Western 
alliances, and it resulted in the opening of negotiations between Yugoslav and American actors. 
Despite NATO airstrikes marking a turning point in the war, Power acknowledges that the lunge 
toward peacemaking was long overdue and Western powers’ use of humanitarian instruments 
like the ICTY perpetuated policies of nonconfrontation.120 Skepticism against judicial 
interference in peacemaking also existed during the crisis period. British Prime Minister John 
Major and French President François Mitterrand opposed the ICTY because “they believed 
holding killers accountable would interfere with [the] search for a negotiated settlement.”121 The 
conviction that pursuing justice delays peace reflects the paradigm that history continuously tugs 
and pulls between justice and peace, often with the latter triumphing over the former.  
American diplomat Richard Holbrooke is the key player that sits in the midst of this tug-
of-war. Holbrooke is pragmatic in his interpretation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, and identifies the utility of the tribunal while also highlighting its 
imperfections. Taken alone, Holbrooke views the tribunal as “little more than a public relations 
device,” but, as the only mechanism for addressing notorious war atrocities, he admits that it was 
imperfect yet vital.122 Its relative ineffectiveness before the Dayton summit in 1995 was 
juxtaposed by how it later “emerged as a valuable instrument of policy that allowed” diplomats 
to bar significant indicted war criminals from negotiations and public office.123 Regardless of 
Milosevic’s plea that indicted criminals – namely Mladić and Karadžić – were integral to 
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peacemaking, Holbrooke refused to compromise on the authority of the tribunal. His firm stance 
on indictments acutely shaped the character of negotiations and effectively diminished the 
authority of Pale Serbs in the political sphere.124 In general, Holbrooke’s account of the war does 
not pay close attention to the ICTY, which is telling of its overall function in the war, but he does 
provide valuable insight into how the tribunal was utilized as an effective tool for policy in the 
United States’ diplomatic and military objectives. 
While the International Criminal Tribunal’s served Western policy objectives, Holbrooke 
also records that the threat of prosecution had narrow deterrent effects on Serbian leaders’ 
actions. To End a War describes how John Shattuck’s work with the ICTY focused global 
attention to atrocity crimes in the region and increased pressure on Milosevic to halt abusive 
practices.125 During meetings with Milosevic, Holbrooke demanded access to war crimes sites, 
conveying to the Serbian leader that American forces were serious about the tribunal and 
indictments. The world later recognized “the value of John Shattuck’s highly publicized, highly 
focused efforts” when Milosevic continuously tried to separate himself from the actions of 
Bosnian Serb war criminals and testified that he held no influence over them.126 For example, 
Milosevic covertly denied relation to Željko Ražnatović, better known as Arkan, one of the most 
infamous war criminals in the conflict. Yet Holbrooke noted how Arkan’s activity in western 
Bosnia decreased immediately after confronting Milosevic about the perpetration of atrocity 
crimes.127  
Throughout To End a War, Holbrooke grapples with the tribunal’s efficacy. In his view 
the court had faint deterrent effects yet positively served diplomatic efforts. Similar to this 
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multifaceted approach of the tribunal, other actors’ perspectives on the ICTY are equally as 
intricate and conflicting. Therefore, how – and to what extent – the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia impacted the course of the crisis in the Balkans remains a 
topic of contention. Each author provides a narrative picture of the tribunal that adds to its 
paradoxical complexion. While some remain proponents for the effectiveness of the tribunal in 
deterring and reconciling mass atrocity, others maintain that it prolonged violence and shielded 
Western interests. The collective consideration of these individual perspectives allows for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the ICTY’s impacts pre-Dayton. In the next section, topics such as 
deterrence, national interest, military intervention and humanitarian (in)action will be measured 
against one another in order to assess the legitimacy of various opinions of the tribunal.    
 
Narrative Analysis  
At the necessary risk of cynicism, it is essential to deny confirmation bias; although the 
view of criminal justice as omnipotent in addressing atrocity and establishing peace is attractive, 
history tells us differently. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was 
preventative and permissive in the face of atrocity, and should not be considered the principal 
factor in defending peace in the Balkans. Both Richard Holbrooke and David Scheffer concede 
that the tribunal did generate deterrent results against Milosevic’s and Bosnian Serb’s military 
conquests, but they were relatively weak and short-lived.128 The extensive length of time taken 
before the tribunal was established also hampered its ability to deter criminals, as it was not fully 
functioning until after the Dayton agreement. From the outset, the ICTY was subjected to high 
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levels of internal criticism by Western bureaucrats, effectively eroding the tribunal’s authority 
and presenting hollow judicial threats to those it sought to deter.   
As the actuality of deterrence disintegrates, the most suitable way to view the role of the 
tribunal is as a humanitarian tool for affecting and fulfilling Western interests in Bosnia. When 
preliminary goals of deterrence materialized to an extent that was lower than anticipated, 
American actors altered their use of the ICTY and employed the tribunal in negotiations and 
responses to international press. Before military intervention, the interplay between the ICTY 
and global media was most prevalent in the U.S.’s defense of inaction through humanitarian 
claims. The tribunal was used as an apparatus to pageant Western action in Bosnia as a justice-
serving, humanitarian alternative to the more effective military means. Both American 
administrations in the years before Dayton opposed military involvement in the region and 
utilized the tribunal as an alternative interventionist measure that appealed to public desire for 
justice and action. As an effective pacifier to cries for Western engagement, the tribunal delayed 
military and diplomatic operations. Given that Operation Deliberate Force was the catalyst for 
opening the pathway to negotiation and ceasefire, the American use of the tribunal extended the 
period of violence before Dayton.  
However, the tribunal was advantageous in alternative peacemaking efforts. One of the 
most productive aspects of the tribunal was its ability to legally exclude Bosnian Serbs like 
Mladić and Karadžić from negotiations in Dayton. Richard Holbrooke applied the ICTY’s 
legislation when it was useful in simplifying his negotiations with Milosevic, Izetbegovic and 
Tudjman.129 Leaving Bosnian Serbs out of negotiations lessened the potential for disagreement 
between the parties and made Milosevic the sole voice of Serb populations. In addition to 
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simplifying channels of negotiation, excluding Bosnian Serbs from the negotiating table publicly 
delegitimized the Republika Srpska and devalued its influence in the political domain. The 
Dayton Agreement specified that indicted war criminals were unable to hold public office, which 
also paved a smoother path towards non-violence in the region after 1995.130 Although there is 
no way of predicting the course of peace otherwise, the exclusion of indicted criminals increased 
the probability of reaching a negotiated settlement between the parties by diminishing the voice 
of aggressive players and the potential for ongoing violence.  
Before the Dayton summit in 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was structurally incapable of serving justice. Hopes of curtailing human rights 
abuses and bringing action against war criminals were left unfulfilled by indictments without 
arrests. Standing alone, the tribunal was insufficiently equipped to reach its initial goals during 
the war. Yet the ICTY did stir the course of conflict when it was aligned with international press, 
public interests, and military and diplomatic processes. The outcomes of interplay between the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and international politics and press 
were beneficial and harmful to the conflict’s trajectory. The humanitarian jurisprudence of the 
tribunal assisted in the political paralysis of the Bosnian Serb faction during the Dayton 
negotiations, while at other times providing the United States and NATO with the means to 
camouflage and prolong their inaction. Incorporating the authority of the tribunal into non-
judicial branches of the conflict thus made for a potent policy tool that was used by Western 
powers in their interest, whether it be pushing back the timeline intervention or excluding 
Bosnian Serbs from peacemaking.    
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PART IV: Legacies and Insights     
“By examining the interaction of great power politics and foreign relations law and framing 
them as potentially complementary systems of constraints, the theory also leads to potentially 
fruitful avenues of thought on the convergence of American politics, foreign relations law and 
international relations theory.” – Daniel Abebe  
Evidently, the ICTY had nuanced effects on war and peace in the Balkans, as well as 
NATO and American politics. These implications, whether fruitful or destructive, flow from the 
court’s judicial framework and the West’s application of it. The ICTY’s pitfalls are equally as 
informative as its successes, and provide insight that is relevant to the development of 
international humanitarian law and politics. Since the beginning of the conflict in the Balkans to 
today, almost every region in the world has borne witness to identity-based violence and mass 
atrocity. Albeit unfortunate, there is no question that there will be future bloodshed that echoes 
the cries from crises like the Balkans, Rwanda and Cambodia. Holbrooke reminds us that there 
will be other Bosnias in our lifetime – ones that demand refined and multifaceted peace 
initiatives alongside flexible and nimble political leadership.131 Thus it is valuable to scrutinize 
the histories of international judicial bodies in order to more fully understand the malleability of 
law to its environment. Using the ICTY as a microcosm for understanding the complicated 
relationship between law, armed conflict and politics can strengthen the international 
community’s capacity for ending deadly conflict.  
Although the Yugoslav tribunal was ineffective as a deterrent before 1996, it nonetheless 
played a considerable role in the safeguarding of international human rights. The ICTY further 
augmented the Rules of Procedure and Evidence “to ensure the trial rights of the accused,” which 
now forms the basis for the rules of evidence and procedure in international humanitarian law.132 
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Similarly, the tribunal also shaped procedural law by broadening the scope of individual criminal 
responsibility, meaning that the responsibility for war crimes falls on all individuals who commit 
them. As opposed to the jurisdiction of the previous military tribunals, the statute of the ICTY 
specified the extent of responsibility: “those who plan or induce the commission of crime, 
prepare, execute or help in any way are also culpable.”133 The requirement for individual 
responsibility instilled by the ICTY stemmed from its fundamental belief that state sovereignty 
does not shield individuals from their crimes.  
Precedent set by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is not 
limited to procedural law. The court also expanded important areas of international law that 
continue to be enforced today. An important area of international humanitarian law that the 
ICTY increased in scope was that of sexual violence and human trafficking. The ICTY 
maintained that “rape and sexual enslavement could be considered crimes of war,” which are 
often used in ethnic cleansing schemes to intimidate, delegitimize and terrorize enemies.134 By 
proving that the prosecution of wartime sexual violence is possible, the ICTY deemed rape as a 
form of torture, and sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity.135 Additionally, the 
tribunal’s development on rules of procedure took industrious steps towards ensuring victims of 
violence do not face retribution by allowing witnesses to testify under pseudonym.136 The 
explicit charges for wartime sexual violence made by the ICTY symbolized a landmark 
judgement of rape as a weapon of war that is now customary in international humanitarian law. 
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Not only did the ICTY further develop pre-existing law, it functioned as a model for 
other ad hoc criminal tribunals in the 1990s.137 Humanitarian crises like Rwanda, Sierra Leone 
and Cambodia necessitated the creation of legal justice initiatives, triggering the subsequent 
formation of multiple ad hoc criminal tribunals. The Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) utilized a structure and “subject-matter jurisdiction which, apart 
from slight nuances, is essentially” the same as that of the ICTY.138 Often referred to as the sister 
tribunal to the ICTY, the ICTR mirrored the ICTY’s three-pronged structure. The two tribunals 
even shared the same appeals chamber.139 At the time of conception, the tribunals that grew out 
of the ICTY were timely and appropriate responses to instances of mass violence, but they were 
not designed for long-term implementation. Judges in the Appeals Chambers were eventually 
unable to handle the caseloads, and the UNSC grew concerned about the financial and 
operational difficulties that accompany ad hoc courts.140  
David Scheffer coined the term “tribunal fatigue” to explain the Security Council’s 
wariness and inability to sustain the construction of more war crimes tribunals in the 1990s.141 
As a result, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was ratified in 1998 as a permanent forum 
with a jurisdiction inter alia over war crimes.142 While the ICTY and ICTR were temporary, they 
developed a strong body of law that future courts like the ICC could build upon. The ICC 
borrows principles of international humanitarian law central to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, 
                                               
137 Samantha Power. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. Page 479.  
138 Guenael Mettraux. International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Oxford Scholarship Online, January 2010. 
Available at: https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207541.001.0001/acprof-
9780199207541-chapter-1 
139 Natalie Kraak. A Comparative Study of the ICTY and ICTR and their “successes:” a deeper look at the legacy 
that will be left behind by these tribunals [thesis]. Utretch University, 2010.  
140 Christodoulos Kaoutzanis. The UN Security Council and International Criminal Tribunals: Procedure Matters. 
Springer International Publishing, 2020.  
141 David, Scheffer. All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals. Princeton University 
Press, 2013. Page 118.  
142 UN General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010). 17 July 1998.  
 48 
and further standardized the laws pertaining to individual criminal responsibility and rape as a 
weapon of war. The United Nations’ decision to create a permanent court for war crimes speaks 
to the notion that the ICTY’s shortcomings were also constructive. Before Dayton, the tribunal 
was unable to establish its credibility because it lacked funding and adequate arrest mechanisms. 
The ICC instead ensured that resources for international jurisdiction were concentrated into a 
single entity, as opposed to multiple ad hoc courts, in order to cultivate authority and a system 
capable of launching “quickly into the [investigation of] atrocity crimes.”143   
Yet a fair judgement of the effectiveness and legacy of a policy must also take into 
account the policymakers and their intentions. In doing so, we can recognize that the varied 
effects that the ICTY had on the course of the wars in the Balkans, as well as on the development 
of international humanitarian law, directly resulted from higher-level decision making. This is 
not to say that the ICTY had no moral compass for protecting the human rights of those impacted 
by atrocities in the region, but rather that the edifice of the tribunal was fundamentally connected 
to power-politics. The historical and political contextualization of the tribunal needed to 
delineate its role in the war also elucidates important lessons about the nexus of international 
relations and law. Despite the advances in international law made since the establishment of the 
ICTY, we should continue to consider the tribunal a political project. As a result, we can more 
thoroughly understand the inextricable link between international law and politics that allows 
Western powers to develop, define, regulate and apply legal humanitarian initiatives as they 
please.  
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Appendix 2. 
 
Chronology 
 
This chronology includes information relevant to the Balkans conflict that spanned from 1991-
1995. It was made using an accumulation of research from the sources in each chapter, as well as 
the Chronology of Serbs in Bosnia report published by the Minorities at Risk Project. 
 
Date(s)  Event/Incident  
29 November 1945 
– January 1946  
Yugoslav monarchy is abolished by the signing of a new constitution 
that establishes the Socialist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
under Joseph Broz Tito. The constitution recognizes the six constituent 
republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Macedonia, along with autonomous provinces Kosovo 
and Vojvodina within Serbia.  
1948  Disappointment with aid packages from the Soviet Union, and Tito’s 
push for Yugoslav regional independence, leads to Yugoslavia’s 
separation from the Soviet Union and other communist states.  
1940 – 1980  Period of leadership under Tito, consisting of a federal parliament, six 
republican parliaments and two provincial parliaments that represents 
Yugoslavia’s political makeup. Repression of nationalist sentiments is 
common during this period in order to diffuse inter-party tensions and 
‘ethnic’ conflict.  
4 May 1980  Death of Joseph Broz Tito. The former Yugoslav leader bequeaths to 
Yugoslavia a collective presidency that is unstable.  
1981 – 1989 Slobodan Milosevic rises to power in a precarious political state. The 
utilization of nationalism helps him to gain power within the republic, 
and later gain influence over the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).  
October 1990  Serbian Democratic Party (Republika Srpska) is established in Bosnia 
and deems itself the representative of Bosnian Serbs.  
25 June 1991  Croatia and Slovenia declare independence.  
27 June 1991 10-Day war between the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) and Slovenia. 
Slovenia ultimately withdraws from the SFRY.  
Outbreak of war occurs in Croatia as well, but it was more protracted.  
July 1990 – January 
1992 
The substantive period of war in Croatia against the JNA. Violence 
continues to occur in the country afterwards, yet this period is 
considered the main war between Serb and Croat forces. Croats lose 1/3 
of their territory and around 10,000 people.  
January 1992 In an attempt to organize negotiations, the European Community (EC) 
indirectly recognizes Croatia as an independent entity from the SFRY 
and grants it independent status.  
January 1992 Serb-controlled JNA moves into northeastern regions of Bosnia after 
declaring Serb Autonomous Regions (SOAs), later announcing the 
solidification of the Republika Srpska.  
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March 1992 – April 
1992 
Bosnian independence is confirmed in a Moslem-Croat referendum 
boycotted by Serbs. The first instances of fighting occur in areas of 
Bosnia like Bosanski Brod.  
April 1992  Shelling and siege of Sarajevo begins and continues until the end of 
war. EC recognizes Bosnia as independent.  
30 May 1992  UNSC Resolution 757 implements sanctions on the flow of goods in 
and out of Yugoslavia. The United Nations implements the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and “UN Safe Areas.”  
July 1992 Serbs control ~70% of Bosnian territory. Numbers of displaced people 
rises to over 1 million.  
August 1992 Global uproar occurs after Roy Gutman’s coverage of Bosnian detention 
camps and that mirror the Holocaust.   
September 1992  The UN (Cyrus Vance) and EC (Lord Owen) open an international 
conference in Geneva and in the attempt to develop a peace plan that 
ultimately fails in creating a viable or sustainable resolution.  
7 October 1992  UN Security Council establishes a war crimes commission to investigate 
atrocities in Bosnia and Croatia. (ICTY). 
November 1992  Croat-Bosniak fighting heightens and triangulates tensions between 
Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. This continues until early 1994.  
March 1993 – June 
1993 
Multiple signing attempts of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan are rejected 
by different parties in the agreement. The plan is considered unrealistic 
by June and is discontinued.  
June 1993 – January 
1994 
Attempts to find peaceful solutions between all parties continues while  
violence rises alongside death toll. Balkan political representatives call 
for Western military intervention.  
January – March 
1994 
NATO threatens to air-strike Bosnian Serbs as an attempt to generate 
deterrence against ethnic cleansing of Muslim enclaves.  
March 1994  The Washington Agreement is established, which creates a truce and 
ends fighting between Bosnian Croat and Bosniak forces.  
September 1994 The UN Security Council condemns Bosnian Serb’s ethnic cleansing 
schemes and imposes tighter economic sanctions on Bosnian-Serb 
controlled areas.  
November 1994 Bosniak and Croat forces align to fight against Bosnian Serbs in 
Northeast regions around Bihac. Serbs are driven out of the area, 
effectively turning the tides of the war and decreasing Bosnian-Serbs’ 
strength.  
14 February 1995  The ICTY charges Bosnian Serb commander of the Omarska camp with 
genocide. Indictments made against 20 other Serb commanders, 
including Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić.  
June 2, 1995  President Clinton announces the decision to commit American troops to 
aid UN peace operations in Bosnia.  
July 1995  Dutch peacekeepers evacuate UN Safe areas that “protect” ethnic 
enclaves due to Bosnian Serb attacks. Srebrenica and Zepa fall to 
Bosnian Serbs. 
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13 July 1995 Genocide occurs in Srebrenica, as at least 8,000 men and boys are killed 
in the largest genocide in Europe since the Holocaust. The Bosnian 
conflict enters a new stage of international intensity and the 
humanitarian aid approach shifts towards military intervention.  
15 August 1995 Shuttle diplomacy begins. Richard Holbrooke begins to negotiate a 
ceasefire between Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs. Bosnian Serbs are barred 
from negotiations due to indictments by the ICTY.  
30 August – 20 
September 1995 
Operation Deliberate Force: NATO forcefully begins bombing Serb 
positions around Sarajevo, marking its largest military action in history. 
Military intervention, territorial advances against Serbs, and economic 
sanctions, gave Holbrooke the necessary leverage to negotiate a peace 
agreement.  
9 September 1995 Warring factions agree to initiate a peace deal brokered by Richard 
Holbrooke.  
1 November – 21 
November 1995  
Peace talks between leaders of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia begin at the 
air force base in Dayton, Ohio. Peace negotiations continue for 20 days 
until issues of territory, governance and displacement are settled. 
Leaders agree to reconvene in Paris in December to sign final 
documents.  
14 December 1995 The Dayton Peace Accord is formally signed in Paris and concluded the 
three-and-a-half year war in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia.  
 
 
Source:  
 
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Serbs in Bosnia, 2004, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f386dc.html.  
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Appendix 3. 
 
Ethnic Composition of the Former Yugoslavia (1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
U.S Central Intelligence Agency. Former Yugoslavia – Ethnic Majorities from Former 
Yugoslavia: A Map Folio, 1992. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: University of 
Texas Libraries. 
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Appendix 4.  
 
The Siege of Sarajevo: Map of Serb Blockade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image provided by Sarajevan tour guide during a historical walking tour. The orange circle 
denotes the “tunnel of hope,” which served as an underground escape passage out of the city 
during the war. The red area exhibits Serb forces’ blockade surrounding Sarajevo. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
Anonymous. Interview by Jordan Moss: Personal and Historical. Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 9 March 2020.   
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Appendix 5.  
 
Research Experience 
 
This appendix contains a collection of photos from my field work in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(March 8 – March 12, 2020). The scars of war remain hyper visible in present day BiH. 
Photography by Luke Lefeber (Vassar 21’).       
 
5A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictured: Jajce Kasarna – military barracks built by the Austro-Hungarian army that later served 
as a military field hospital in 1915. The building was destroyed during the war in the 1990s by 
Serbian mortar attacks.  
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5B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictured: Residual impacts of mortar attacks and shrapnel linger on buildings in Sarajevo’s Old 
Town, formally known as Baščaršija. 
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5C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictured: Srebenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide. 
Around 8,300 victims are honored in the memorial and an estimated 1,000 more are believed 
to still remain hidden in mass graves throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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5D.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictured: Sarajevo’s open-air market that experienced the most deadly mortar attack during 
the city’s siege. The vibrant Pijaca Markale (the Markale Market) is currently full-
functioning and offers a variety of seasonal fruits, vegetables, flowers, etc. 
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Appendix 6. 
 
Ethnic Cleansing Camps – Bosnia (1992 – 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
 
Remembering Srebrenica. Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia. N.d. Available at: 
http://www.srebrenica.org.uk/what-happened/history/ethnic-cleansing-bosnia/ 
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